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Abstract. Anonymity services in the EU may be forced by the new EU
data retention directive to collect connection data and deanonymise some
of their users in case of serious crimes. For this purpose, we propose a new
privacy-friendly solution for incorporating revocation in an anonymous
communication system. In contrast to other known methods, our scheme
does not reveal the identity of a user to any other entity involved in the
revocation procedure but the law enforcement agency. Another advan-
tage is, that no user will need to provide more identifying information
than his connection (IP) address, that is what he needs to communi-
cate with the system anyway. The proposed scheme is based mainly on
threshold group signatures and threshold atomic proxy re-encryption.
1 Introduction
On december 14, 2005, the EU parliament has passed a data retention directive
that forces all EU telecommunication providers to store the connection data of
their users for at least six months. The goal is to use the data “for the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious criminal offences” [EP05].
Unfortunately, this act gives the member states’ legislature the possibility, almost
at its will, to raise the retention interval and to define the type of crimes that
allow the local law enforcement agencies to request the connection data.
If running in the EU, even anonymity services are forced to obey the act men-
tioned, and non-EU countries will adapt to this directive with a high possibility,
too. In Germany, for example, even without this new law anonymity providers
are, in certain cases, obliged to release connection data to law enforcement agen-
cies [FeGo04]. Therefore, sooner or later, a deanonymisation protocol is needed
for all anonymity systems that are not of pure theoretical nature.
In this paper we propose a new scheme that - in case of a court order - allows
for deanonymisation without weakening the general trust model of an anonymity
service. Moreover, the revocation of anonymity should preserve the privacy of
all lawful users, especially without the need of logging all communication data.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we describe our require-
ments for revocation and deduce the general attributes of our scheme. Section 3
gives an overview of related work. Section 4 describes the basic idea and recalls
properties of cryptographic primitives used. Section 5 describes our scheme in
detail and Section 6 analyses the security of the scheme.
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2 Revocation Requirements
The scenario we have in mind is pictured in Figure 1. Some users want to access
the Internet anonymously and therefore use an anonymity service C. This service
is based on n intermediary servers. We will call such a server Anonymiser.
Fig. 1. Anonymous communication system
As the revocation scheme should not depend on a certain anonymity mechanism
it does not matter how the anonymity service works in detail. In practice the
anonymity service could be based on Mix cascades [Chau81], DC-nets [Chau88],
threshold-mixes [Jak99a] etc.
The only assumption on the type of service is that the service offers uncon-
ditional anonymity as long as not at least k of the n servers collude (e.g. k=n
for Mixes). Note that this assumption defines the trust model of the anonymity
service: a user has to trust that the number of colluding servers is less than k.
Otherwise the service will not provide any anonymity at all.
To depict law enforcement processes, two extra parties are added to the basic
system: A law enforcement agency L that wants to observe certain communica-
tion relations, and a judge J that may confirm this request by a court order O.
If this order is obligatory for the operators of all Anonymisers, the supervision
has to be done.
We want to stress these facts, as it turns out that many people have some
“back-doored” system in mind if they think about revocable anonymous com-
munication. The term “back-doored” is misleading for various reasons:
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– It suggests the existence of a hidden and undocumented functionality within
the system – our approach, in contrast, is well documented and especially
communicated to the users of the anonymity service.
– It suggests that a single centralised entity has the possibility to deanonymise
every arbitrary communication – in contrast, the approach described in this
paper needs the cooperation of different entities to deanonymise a certain
communication relation. In addition, only a well defined subset of these enti-
ties will learn something about the identity of the communication partners.
– It implies that there is an automatic procedure that allows deanonymisation
without human interaction. Although the proposed protocol may work in
this way, too, our suggestion is that only human representatives of the or-
ganisations that run the Anonymisers may trigger “deanonymisation events”
(see chapter 6).1
– It implies that there exists a “no-back-doored” system for anonymous com-
munication which offers unconditional anonymity. But to our knowledge such
a system neither exists in theory nor in practice – due to the fact that
deanonymisation is always possible if more or stronger parties than specified
by the attacker model collude.
Figure 2 illustrates that designs for revocable anonymity are not only black or
white solutions regarding privacy, but exist in different shapes of grey:
Fig. 2. Designs for revocable anonymity exist in different shapes of grey
As we know from a practical system, law enforcement agencies do typically not
observe certain users, but usually just want to know the IP address of the sender
of a certain message [Ko¨Mi05]. The IP address contains information regarding
the ISP, who will, after a court order, provide the law enforcement agency with
the name, address etc. of the corresponding user. Therefore, the proposed scheme
is desinged to reveal the connection data of an observed user request only, but
may of course be easily extended to provide more identifying information.
1 In the following it is assumed that each Anonymiser is run by an independent or-
ganisation. Therefore “Anonymiser” is used as synonym for “organisation”, too.
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In the following, the messages requested by L are called “suspicious”. The
decision which messages are “suspicious” is either based on the recipient’s ad-
dress (IP-address, URL etc.) or on the message content. The procedure how to
identify “suspicious” messages is independent of the deanonymisation protocol
and is beyond the scope of this paper.
The following requirements summarise the required attributes Full Traceabil-
ity (1,2,3) and Full Anonymity (4,5):
1. It has to be feasible to disclose the identity of the sender of any given “sus-
picious” message. There must be no need to rely on the help of the sender.
2. Revocation should only deanonymise a single user ID, but should not affect
the anonymity of other users (besides that the size of the anonymity set
decreases by one).
3. Based on the link between a user ID and a requested “suspicious” message,
it must be impossible for any entity (the user itself or entities involved in
the revocation process) to lie on the ID.
4. For privacy reasons, the link between the ID and the “suspicious” mes-
sage must not be revealed to any other entity than L. In particular, the
Anonymisers must not learn anything about ID.
5. The revocation scheme has to be compatible with the trust model of the
anonymity service, that means at least k of the n Anonymisers have to co-
operate to deanonymise a certain user and less than k of them are malicious.
3 Related Work
[Golle04] describes a method for Mix networks that allows a Mix to prove that
he is not the sender of a given “suspicious” message. The procedure is based on
blind signatures and does not offer the possibility to identify the real sender of
the “suspicious” message.
The ticket-based authentication system described in [BeFK01] is also based
on blind signatures. Its goal is to protect against flooding attacks. A user has to
pseudonymously register with all Mixes and gets so-called tickets (credentials)
valid for a short period of time and allowing him to anonymously send messages.
The user has to send a valid ticket with every message.
This original method does not offer the option to link a certain message to
its sender by means of the tickets. [ClDı´03] is an extension of [BeFK01] where
this linkage is possible. This is achieved by using fair blind signatures instead
of blind signatures. From a privacy point of view a disadvantage of [ClDı´03]
is, that besides the law enforcement agency also other entities involved in the
revocation procedure learn the identity of the sender. Another disadvantage
is, that the user needs to request a new ticket for every message he wants to
send.
[BaNe99] explains how payment for an anonymity service could be done by the
means of anonymous digital cash. The main idea is that every message contains
a digital coin which the Mix will get for processing the message. If we used a
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fair anonymous digital cash system, then the fairness property could be used to
reveal the spender (sender) of the digital coin. But as there are no such payment
schemes in practice this does not solve the problem.
4 Preliminaries: Basic Idea and Cryptographic Primitives
The basic idea of our revocation scheme is similar to the one proposed in [ClDı´03]:
Any request (message) that should reach its recipient has to be signed pseudony-
mously. A verifier V sitting between the last Anonymiser and the recipients will
check this. V will drop any unsigned message. If V detects a “suspicious” request,
he demands the disclosure of the true identity of the pseudonym.
Note that this scheme allows sending of revocable and unconditional anony-
mous messages using the same anonymity service at the same time without
changing the anonymity protocol etc. This is achieved by instructing V not to
check any signature if the request is for certain recipients (for instance a voting
machine), which are allowed to receive anonymous requests unconditionally.
Cryptographic Primitives
In order to explain our solution in detail, we first recall properties of the crypto-
graphic primitives used in the revocation scheme.2 These building blocks
are: threshold group signatures, blind signatures and threshold atomic proxy
re-encryption.
Recall the following properties of a threshold group signature scheme that
provides Full Anonymity and Full Traceability [CaGJ99, CaGr04, CaLy04]:
– Full Anonymity allows group members to anonymously sign messages. Any-
one who knows the public group key can check signatures done by a group
member but cannot link a signature to the group member by whom it was
created.
– To join the group, a user creates a pseudonym Y and performs the Join(Y )
operation with the help of GM. As a result, the user learns his secret group
key skY and may now forge signatures that are verifyable with the public
group key.
– Full Traceability means that without the secret key of a group member it is
infeasible to create a valid signature that could be linked to this member.
Note that this holds even if the secret key of GM is exposed, so that GM in
particular cannot generate signatures that are linkable to this group member.
– The group manager GM can revoke the anonymity of a given signature. This
will reveal the pseudonym Y under which the signer is known to the group
manager.3
2 A security discussion of these primitives is beyond the scope of this paper. They are
used as basic building blocks only.
3 Note that GM does not necessarily get to know the true identity ID of Y and that the
anonymity revocation capability could be separated from the member management
capability.
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– Threshold means that the group manager GM is distributed on n parties
and that at least k of these parties are needed to revoke the anonymity of a
group member.
Recall the following properties of a blind signature scheme [CaKW04] that pro-
vides Unforgeability and a Partial Message Proof [Rab78]:
– SigE(m) denotes a signature on m done by the entity E.
– Blindness allows a user U to get a signature SigE(m) on a message m from
a signer E by interacting with E, whereas E does not know the message
content and is not able to link SigE(m) with the protocol session during
which SigE(m) was created, or with the user that sent the message and
received the signature, respective.
– Unforgeability means that after k runs of the protocol with the signer, the
user cannot obtain strictly more than k valid message-signature pairs.
– [m] denotes a blinded version of m.
– SigblindE ([m]) denotes a blind signature on m which after unblinding leads to
SigE(m).
– Partial Message Proof means that the signer E only signs a message m
blindly if he can previously verify a part pm of the message m. This could
be achieved using cut-and-choose protocols or by selecting a blind signature
scheme that incorporates zero-knowledge proofs on pm. In a (simple) cut-
and-choose protocol, for example, U sends many blinded versions of the
message m that must all contain a valid pm to E. E selects all but one of
them which U has to unblind so that E can read them. E signs the remaining
blinded message m if all unblinded messages contain a valid pm.
Recall the following properties of a threshold atomic proxy re-encryption
scheme [Jak99b]:
– A (k, n)-threshold atomic proxy re-encryption scheme allows any k members
of a group of n entities to re-encrypt an encrypted message m which is en-
crypted with the public key of the group. The result of the re-encryption
is the message m encrypted with another public key, whereas m is not
revealed.
– Ency(m) denotes an encryption of m done with the public key y.
– Ency1(m) →
P
Ency2(m) denotes a re-encryption from the public key y1 to the
public key y2. This will lead to a proof P , showing that both encryptions
decrypt to the same message m. Any third party can verify this proof.
5 The Revocation Scheme
This section describes the revocation scheme in detail. We revise our basic idea
introducing some new parties and describe the different protocol steps in detail.
The pseudonymous signatures mentioned in the basic idea are in fact group
signatures. If V detects a “suspicious” message, the group manager GM will
revoke the anonymity of the signature. This leads to the pseudonym Y and a
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certificate issued by a third party I. This certificate links Y to an encrypted iden-
tity EncyC (ID). This encryption is done with the public key yC of the anonymity
service. The Anonymisers will jointly proxy re-encrypt ID to the public key yL of
the law enforcement agency L : EncyC (ID) →
P
EncyL(ID). L can finally decrypt
this to ID. Figure 3 illustrates this.
Fig. 3. Overview of the revocation scheme and the involved parties
General Setup
The Anonymisers A1, . . . , An jointly generate a public key yC of a (k, n)-
threshold atomic proxy re-encryption scheme and the public group verification
key yGM of a (k, n)-threshold group signature scheme. They are thus commonly
seen as the group manger GM.4 The party I publishes the public verification
key yI of its blind signature scheme.
User Login Procedure
In order to use the anonymity service each user has to login to it first. Besides
the necessary key exchange to encrypt a message according to the Anonymiser
protocol, the login procedure comprises the following steps:
1. A user U creates a self-signed certificate that includes his current connection
address ID as attribute (e.g. his IP address).
4 For simplification, the group manager will be seen as separate entity in most cases.
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2. He non-anonymously connects to the Anonymiser that may grant access to
the anonymity service to let his certificate get signed by him. The certificate
will get a timestamp and may only be used for requesting a group signature
key as long as the connection to the access-granting Anonymiser is held.5
3. U selects a random pseudonym Y .
4. Now the user U contacts the third party I and requests a blind signature
c = (Y,EncyC (ID, SigID(Y, ID)))
U −→ I : [c], SigID([c])
5. I issues the blind signature, but only if I is confident that she really signs
an encryption of the right ID with respect to U (partial message proof). If
this is done by cut-and-choose, U has to reveal Y and SigID(Y, ID) several
times so that I can do the encryption EncyC (ID, SigID(Y, ID)) to verify the
unblinded messages. Therefore, for each blinded message, U has to choose
another pseudonym Yi and re-encrypt EncyC (ID, SigID(Yi, ID)). Otherwise
I would know Y and the encrpytion of the corresponding SigID(Y, ID) and
could, in collusion with one of the other parties, get the ID of the sender of
a malicious message m.
I −→ U : SigblindI ([c])
6. U unblinds the signature and gets cert = SigI (Y,EncyC (ID, SigID(Y, ID)))
7. U becomes a group member by performing the Join() operation with the
group manager using the pseudonym Y . U also sends cert to GM. Note that
all communication with GM is done unconditional anonymously using the
anonymity service C. Otherwise he would get the connection address and
therefore, in the end, the real identity of U .
U −→ GM : Join(Y ), cert
8. Now the user may connect to the anonymiser service using his group signa-
ture key for authentication.
Sending Messages Anonymously
U can now send messages anonymously according to the Anonymiser protocol.
The additional step he has to do is to sign the messages with his secret group
signature key sgkY . V will check for every message whether it is signed and veri-
fies the signature with yGM. If the signature is OK and the message is “good”, it
will be forwarded to the requested resource. If m does not have a valid signature,
the message is dropped.
Revoking Anonymity
The prerequisite for revoking anonymity is that V gets a court order O. O
contains a public key yL of the law enforcement agency L and a relation R,
which says for every message m if m is “suspicious” or “good”; R : {m} →
{“good”, “suspicious”}.
5 Note that this temporary certificate may be replaced by a real one if a PKI with
trusted authorities exists. This certificate could contain much more information than
only the connection address at a certain time and would therefore tend to be less
privacy-friendly but far more accountable.
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Fig. 4. The revocation procedure
If V detects a “suspicious” message m, revealing the identity of the sender
works as follows (cf. Fig. 4):6
1. V shows m, Sig(m) and O to GM.
2. GM checks that R(m) = “suspicious” and verifies Sig(m).
3. GM reveals cert = SigI (Y,EncyC (ID, SigID(Y, ID))) and a proof Pr that
Sig(m) was done by Y .
4. V verifies cert and Pr and shows m, Sig(m), O, cert and Pr to k of the
Anonymisers A1, . . . , An.
5. Each Anonymiser Ai of these k Anonymisers checks that R(m)=“suspicious”
and verifies Sig(m), cert and Pr .
6. The k Anonymisers jointly proxy re-encrypt EncyC (ID, SigID(Y, ID)):
EncyC (ID, SigID(Y, ID)) →
P
EncyL (ID, SigID(Y, ID))
One of the k Anonymisers sends EncyL (ID, SigID(Y, ID)) and the proof P
that both encryptions decrypt to same content to V .
7. V verifies P and sends m, Sig(m), cert , Pr , EncyL (ID, SigID(Y, ID)) and P
to L.
8. L checks that R(m) = “suspicious” and verifies Sig(m), cert , Pr and P .
9. L decrypts EncyL (ID, SigID(Y, ID)) to ID and SigID(Y, ID).
10. L verifies SigID(Y, ID).
6 We assume that every non malicious party will only proceed if the checks she has to
do are successful.
Revocable Anonymity 215
Efficiency Remarks
In practical systems performance is crucial. Especially when no revocation takes
place - that is the case most of the time the system is running - the performance
of the underlying anonymity service should be affected as little as possible.
The overhead introduced arises from the group signature check that V has to
perform for every message. In case the scheme described in [CaGr04] is used, the
verification of a single signature takes about three times as long as the verifica-
tion of an RSA signature with comparable security parameters. If the anonymity
service introduces linkability between messages by the means of anonymous com-
munication channels, then V only needs to check one signature per channel in-
stead of one per message. Additionally, if the anonymity service concurrently
outputs a bunch of messages, a group signature scheme should be used where
verifying x messages at once is less expensive than verifying x times a single mes-
sage [BeGR98]. This is appropriate for instance for anonymity services based on
Mixes working in batch mode.
6 Security Analysis
As defined in section 2, the revocation scheme should provide the two properties
Full Traceability and Anonymity:
1. Full Traceability means that without the secret key of a user it is infeasible to
create a valid revocation that wrongly leads to this user (or more informally:
it is impossible for a given message m sent by the user ID to convince L that
m was sent by another user ID ’.)
2. Anonymity means that without the help of k colluding Anonymisers or all
but one users it should hold that:
A1 besides L and the sender U no other party learns the identity ID of the
sender U of a given “suspicious” message m
A2 in case no revocation takes place the system should provide the same
anonymity as the underlying anonymity service would provide without
the revocation scheme. Informally that means that the existence of the
revocation scheme does not influence the anonymity of “good” messages.
Full Traceability
This property deduces from the properties of the chosen signature schemes. In
order to analyse if the proposed scheme offers Full Traceability, we have to look
at steps 2 and 8 of the login procedure and at the checks done by L in the steps 8
and 10 of the revocation procedure.
(1) In step 8 of the login procedure, the user U has to authenticate himself at
the anonymity service with his group signature key that, in the end, leads
to his current connection address (identity) ID. If the user does not collude
with the Anonymiser that grants access to the service or with the third party
I, he has no chance to cheat by presenting another certificate or by choosing
another address, as the Anonymiser has signed the certificate in step 2, both
can compare the ID attribute and the user’s current address, and the blind
and group signature keys are replaced within short time periods.
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(2) If U colludes with the Anonymiser that grants access, he may lie on his real
address. But without this protocol, and if all connection addresses simply
had to be logged and given to the law enforcement agency instead (worst
case for privacy), the problem would be the same if these parties colluded.
This is therefore no weakness of the revocation protocol7.
(3) In step 10 L verifies the signature SigID(Y, ID), which in fact is a statement
given by the user with ID that he is responsible for all messages signed by the
pseudonym Y . As the signature scheme itself complies with unforgeability, it
is impossible for an attacker to generate a signature SigID′(Y, ID
′) without
the help of ID ’.
(4) In step 8 L verifies SigY (m) and Pr, where Pr is a proof that SigY (m) was
done by Y . This is in fact a check that GM has revealed the right Y . Due
to the Full Traceability property of the group signature scheme, an attacker
could not create a valid signature that frames Y without knowing the secret
key of Y . Note that this holds even if the group manager colludes with the
attacker.
As shown in (1), (3) and (4) the attacker can neither manipulate SigY (m) nor
SigID(Y, ID). Therefore m has to be sent by ID. In case of (2), the manipulation
is not in the scope of this scheme, but of the law enforcement agencies and the
attacking Anonymiser that will be punished if caught.
Anonymity
Note that, according to the assumptions made in section 2, regardless of the
revocation scheme the anonymity service will not provide any anonymity if at
least k Anonymisers collude.
(1) A1 and A2 hold as long as the group manager does not collude with the
attacker. This derives from the facts that
– the GM is the only one that can reveal the pseudonym of a given sender
that is needed to get his ID (satisfies A1) and
– the only change made to the underlying anonymity service was adding
a group signature and this scheme offers full-anonymity (satisfies A2).
(2) In order to break A1, the attacker has to learn the true identity ID of
the owner of Y . GM himself does not know ID because during the Join()
operation (step 7 of the login procedure) the communication with the user
was done by means of an unconditional anonymity service. Also colluding
with I would not help, because the linkage between Y and ID by means of
the signature issued by I on cert is impossible due to the blindness property
of the signature scheme.
(3) If it is possible for the attacker to reveal the pseudonym Y of the sender of
a given message m, A2 would be broken as the attacker could link messages
which are sent by the same sender and therefore has at least a higher chance
of intersection attacks. But as less than k Anonymisers collude with the
attacker, GM cannot reveal Y .
7 If a PKI with trusted authorities is available, these temporary certificates may be
replaced by real ones with high accountability but less privacy-friendliness.
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This makes clear that the anonymity of the system is not tampered by this
scheme apart from the fact that, of course, the anonymity set is decreased by
one member for each “suspicious” message.8
Additional Remarks
It is not possible to simplify the revocation scheme by omitting the blind signature
from party I and just using the identity ID of U as pseudonym Y for the threshold
group signature scheme. This would mean that, in the revocation process, all k
revoking group managers or Anonymisers, respective, would learn both ID and
m and may easily link them. The benefit of the revocation scheme would be at
least very questionable, and virtually no benefit would remain if k = n.
If V is “malicious” with respect to the law enforcement agency L, he could
ignore and, in order not to make himself “suspicious”, block all “suspicious”
messages. In this case, no revocation is done at all. This behaviour of V is not
preventable in general, but could be detected later on if m is not blocked and
leads to an incident detectable by L. Otherwise, if a revocation takes place, the
procedure either reveals the identity of the sender of the “suspicious” message
or identifies a malicious party (V , GM, I, Ai).
Identifying Malicious Parties
If V tries to revoke the anonymity of a “good” message m, he has to prove that
he has shown m, Sig(m) and O to GM. As V is not able to do this, he is detected
as malicious party and the revocation procedure fails.
If the user U colludes with I and uses a faked ID certificate, I would get
exposed as malicious party as the ID certificate has to be signed by the access-
granting Anonymiser9 and the timestamp in the certificate would not fit to the
validity of the blind signature key of I.
If GM can’t reveal the pseudonym Y of the group member who signed m or
can’t show a valid cert then GM is malicious. If the proof Pr does not hold then
some Anonymisers cheat during the re-encryption. The re-encryption scheme
reveals which Anonymisers are malicious. If L can’t decrypt what he gets to a
valid signature SigID(Y, ID) then I is malicious.
Recommendations for Combining Entities
The revocation scheme introduces a lot of new entities: I, J , V , L, and GM. The
security discussion has made clear that a collusion between these entities does
not lead to the deanonymisation of a message m without the help of at least k
Anonymisers or will at least expose the malicious parties. It is therefore allowed
to simplify the organisational structure and combine these entities among each
other and with the Anonymisers. These combinations may influence the general
performance of the protocol and, in a small manner, security and trust aspects.
8 Even this is not the case for more than one “suspicious” messages that are sent by
the same sender.
9 Note again that these temporary certificates may be replaced by real ones.
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Generally, the more entities are combined, the more trust must be set in single
entities by the system users.
Combining J with other entities does not make sense, as, in this context,
judges won’t do any other work than creating court orders for L and, on the
other hand, must be independent from other entities by law.
I could be integrated in all Anonymisers that grant access to the anonymity
service, for example in the first Mix of a Mix cascade. The creation of the
temporary certificate may be thus combined with the creation of the blind
signature.
V may be operated by L. This would mean that all “suspicious” messages
that are not blocked by the last Anonymiser will surely be deanonymised. On
the other hand, overeager officers could try to block some “good” messages.
Therefore, a better choice would be to let the last Anonymiser in the cascade
run V , as he has the power to block (and thus hide) messages anyway.
For the reason that an Anonymiser run by a police authority will diminish
the general user trust in the whole service greatly, L should never be combined
with an Anonymiser. Even if combined with V , it may be realised by the users
as part of the system. Combining it with another entity does not make sense,
either, as law enforcement agencies won’t do any work that is not directly useful
for crime detection, prevention and prosecution.
Last but not least GM is, as defined before, integrated in the n Anonymisers.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a new scheme for incorporating revocation in an anony-
mous communication system. In contrast to known methods, our scheme is
zero-knowledge with respect to any entity involved in the revocation procedure
but the law enforcement agency. Another advantage is, that the user needs to
authenticate himself only once to anonymously send as many messages as he
wants. Moreover, the very privacy-friendly user identification by his connection
address may be sufficient for his authentication, as the responsibility to find
the real identity behind the address may be assigned to the law enforcement
agency.
This scheme is sufficient to serve the type of surveillance requests currently
launched by law enforcement agencies, namely to revoke the anonymity of the
sender of a certain request. A subsequent work could be to design schemes that
allow for the uncovering of all requests of a certain user, while diminishing the
privacy of the other anonymity group members as little as possible. As stated
before, this kind of revocation is not yet needed in practical systems, but could
be of interest in the future.
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